Category: SSL

SSL/TLS certificate duration reduced to 45 days by 2027:Apple takes the first step

On October 9, Apple revealed to the CA/Browser Forum that it had posted a draft ballot for comment on GitHub regarding two important SSL/TLS certificate lifetime events:

  • Gradually reduce the maximum duration of public SSL/TLS certificates to 45 days by 2027;
     
  • Gradually reduce the reuse period for DCV challenges to 10 days by 2027.

In March 2023, in its “Moving Forward, Together” roadmap, Google announced its intention to offer the CA/B Forum a reduction on the maximum possible validity period for public TLS certificates going  from 398 days to 90 days. Since this announcement, the market has been feverishly awaiting for Google’s confirmation but most of all, for the implementation’s timetable… without success. For its part, Mozilla announced, a few weeks ago, its intention to follow Google’s lead on its Firefox browser, without adding any further detail.

Apple ultimately took the first step last week, announcing on October 9th its intention to both reduce the lifetime of certificates to 45 days (when the entire market was expecting 90 days) and to limit the duration of the DCV challenge to 10 days, according to the schedule below. A true bombshell:

Sep-15-2025 => certificates and DCV validation times reduced to 200 days

Sep-15-2026 => certificates and DCV validation times reduced to 100 days

Apr-15-2027 => certificates and DCV validation times reduced to 45 days

Sep-15-2027 => DCV Validation time: 10 days

Information on the background and analysis of this announcement, the expected outcomes and how to prepare for them will undoubtedly be useful:

Context and Analysis:

At this stage, the publication is likely to be commented by market players prior to the formal drafting of the ballot within the CA/B Forum, which itself will be voted on by its members: the Internet browser publishers on the one hand (Google, Mozilla, Apple and Microsoft…) and the Certification Authorities on the other. Amendments are bound to be made, but the general idea remains and the machine is up and running.

Indeed, software publishers are all aligned on the need to reduce the lifetime of certificates, and among Certification Authorities, Sectigo, one of the major players in the certificate industry, is already supporting the initiative. It is likely that things will move rapidly from now on, with few comments and a ballot drafted in the coming weeks or months. We will then know more about the confirmation of the durations and timetable, and will of course make sure to keep you informed.

Expected Outcomes:

  • Certificate lifetime: whether 90 days, 45 days or even less, this reduction is no longer a surprise, and will have a major impact on public certificate portfolio. The certificates can no longer be managed manually. The market has begun its transition to automation, notably through CLMs (Certificate Lifecycle Managers). The issue at stake for companies and organizations will be to rely on partners who can offer as many interconnections as possible between Organizations, Certification Authorities and CLMs.
     
  • DCV challenge duration: Reducing the duration of the DCV challenge to 10 days, if validated, would have a considerable impact, perhaps even more so than reducing the lifetime of certificates. Up until now, the industry has pre-validated domain names for 398 days, using the DCV challenge only once. Apple’s announcement would thus force the use of a DCV challenge for virtually all orders, which would be a major paradigm shift and would involve interconnections with an additional brick in the ecosystem: the DNS. The DCV (Domain Control Validation) challenge involves intervening in the zone of the domain name(s) listed in the certificate, ideally instantaneously, to validate it.
     
  • Organization authentication duration: Apple has not announced anything on the subject of the validity period of organization authentication for OV certificates, which is currently 825 days. However, rumors are circulating that this may be reduced to 398 days or even 365 days.

How to be ready:

The key to successful certificates management lies in automation. A 45 days certificate lifetime represents 9 interventions per year per certificate. Manual management thus becomes utopian. We therefore need to rely on:

  1. Certificate Provider/Certification Authority (CA): a trusted partner who will support through your organizational and domain authentication issues. Service level is key to good management. A multi-CA partner is thus recommended to limit dependence on a single CA, as in the case of Entrust’s recent setbacks. 
     
  2. Registrar / Primary DNS: mastering the primary DNS of domain names listed in certificates will become the key to delivery. Each time a certificate is issued, a TXT or CNAME will be installed on the zone(s) in question. An interconnection between the CA and the DNS is vital.
     
  3. CLM editor: the CLM’s role is to inventory the certificate portfolio, to define certificate portfolio management rules and automate the entire process of orders, from the generation of CSRs to the deployment of certificates on servers. To function properly, the CLM relies on connectors with CAs or certificate suppliers.

Getting ready thus means identifying the most suitable solution, based on these three dimensions, and undertaking this analysis to understand the impacts in terms of process, technology, and budget – in an ideal world – before the end of the first half of 2025.

Nameshield’s approach:

Nameshield holds a unique position in the market as a registrar and supplier of multi-AC certificates. For over 10 years, we have been managing the day-to-day issues associated with authenticating organizations and domains using certificates. On the one hand, we have a privileged relationship with the biggest CAs on the market (Digicert, Sectigo, GlobalSign), and on the other, we master the DNS brick for DCV validation. As a result, we can issue public certificates almost instantaneously. Last but not least, Nameshield has connectors with the major players in the CLM market, allowing you to ensure a comprehensive connection between the various components involved in certificate management. This way, we can support you in anticipating all the issues mentioned above.

SSL/TLS certificate duration reduced to 45 days by 2027:Apple takes the first step

For more information, please contact our Sales team or our Certificates team.

Crédit image : Nameshield with storyset.com

ALERT: TLS/SSL certificates – Phishing vigilance

ALERT: TLS/SSL certificates - Phishing vigilance

Important: information relating to the situation in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine.

In response to the evolving geopolitical situation in Ukraine, many SSL certification authorities are suspending the issuance and reissuance of all types of certificates affiliated with Russia and Belarus.

This includes suspending issuance and reissuance of certificates to TLDs related to Russia and Belarus, including .ru, .su, .by, .рф, as well as to organizations with addresses in Russia or Belarus. We will keep you informed as soon as the situation returns to normal.

Also, we observe a significant increase in phishing attacks. We advise you to be extra vigilant, especially when it comes to new domain name registrations using your trademarks.

Nameshield remains of course at your disposal to accompany and advise you in this complex context.

What is Extended Validation (EV) and how important is it?

Cybersecurity - SSL certificate - EV

SSL certificates ensure the encryption and integrity of data exchanged between a browser and a web server. There are different levels of certificates, Extended Validation (EV), Organizational Validation (OV) and Domain Validation (DV), which vary depending on the degree of authentication. The Extended Validation type SSL certificate provides the highest level of SSL authentication. It is obtained through a comprehensive and globally standardized identity verification process established by the CA / Browser Forum.

Regardless of the selected SSL level, encryption and data integrity can be guaranteed by Extended Validation (EV), Organizational Validation (OV) and Domain Validation (DV), but they do vary depending on the degree of authentication. The Extended Validation type SSL certificate provides the highest level of SSL security. It is obtained through a comprehensive, globally standardized identity verification process ratified by the CA / Browser Forum.

The EV SSL certificate enables HTTPS security and the now gray padlock in the browser’s address bar, just like DV and OV certificates. The additional cost and time spent on verification makes it more difficult to obtain EV level certificates for phishing sites. Therefore internet users can use this certificate as a mark of trust and feel more secure when communicating and making purchases.

On June 12, 2007, the CA/Browser Forum officially ratified the first version of the Extended Validation SSL Guidelines, which took effect immediately. The formal approval successfully brought to a close more than two years of effort and provided the infrastructure for trusted website identity on the Internet.

Most major browsers created visual indicators for pages loaded over HTTPS and secured by an EV certificate soon after the standard was created: they displayed the validated identity, which is a combination of organization name and legal status, in the URL bar. Safari for iOS, Windows Phone, Firefox for Android, Chrome for Android and iOS, also added these indicators.

In May 2018, Google announced plans to redesign Google Chrome user interfaces and remove emphasis on EV certificates. Chrome 77, released in 2019, removed the EV certificate indication from omnibox. Firefox 70 followed and removed the distinction in the omnibox or URL bar : EV and DV certificates are displayed similarly with just a padlock icon, but the information on the EV certificate status is still accessible in the more detailed view that opens after clicking on the padlock icon.

SSL EV certificate - Nameshield

An EV certificate displayed in Firefox

The increasing use of mobile devices and the removal of the visual indicator EV by browsers has significantly reduced the interest of some entities in using this level of security, but the EV is still very important in our daily lives.

Today, phishing websites are unfortunately still a major threat to legitimate websites and online services. These cybercriminals use DV certificates, usually obtained from a free SSL service that does not conduct adequate phishing checks, to make their sites appear more trustworthy. They are able to easily deceive unsuspecting victims and trick them into disclosing financial or personal information.

A very strong increase in phishing has been observed since March 2020, with the beginning of lockdown and remote working for many people: the volume of phishing sites increased by 47% for the first quarter of 2020, and 82.7% of attacks phishers used DV SSL certificates. This problem is only growing and increases the need to verify identities online.

Image source : TheDigitalArtist via Pixabay

New document : 5 minutes to understand SSL / TLS certificates

5 minutes to understand - SSL/TLS certificates - Nameshield

An SSL (Secure Socket Layer) or TLS (Transport Layer Security) certificate is a digital certificate that authenticates a server (most often a web server) and encrypts the data exchanged with it. The data is thus exchanged in confidence between two actors whose identity is known. The data exchanged cannot be spied on or altered by a third party: confidentiality and integrity.

Download this document “5 minutes to understand: SSL / TLS certificates” on Nameshield’s website.

Download

Firefox 83 launches HTTPS-Only mode

On November 17, Mozilla released the version 83 of the Firefox browser, promising improved performance in terms of page loading and browsing responsiveness, as well as a significant reduction in the memory used.

But above all, Mozilla introduces a brand-new security feature to the small world of browsers, an “HTTPS-Only Mode” option to limit browsing to secure HTTPS* connections only.

Firefox 83 launches HTTPS-Only mode
Image source: Mozilla Security Blog

Mozilla is pushing it further regarding the desire of major browsers to pass HTTPS as the default browsing protocol instead of the unencrypted and therefore fully visible HTTP.

Which display during browsing?

When the option is activated, any web page that does not have an SSL/TLS certificate (allowing the HTTPS and the security padlock icon to be displayed in the browser address bar) will be preceded by the warning message below, which is restrictive for web users.

Firefox 83 launches HTTPS-Only mode
Image source: Mozilla Security Blog

What to expect in the coming years?

If the option is not yet activated by default, Mozilla’s management indicates that it expects HTTPS to become the standard for browsing the Web. Driven by the successive evolutions of browsers and their increasingly obvious displays of a lack of security, more and more websites are migrating to HTTPS by default. It is likely that browsers makers will decide to completely depreciate HTTP connections in the near future, making HTTPS the default protocol for Web browsing.

How can companies be prepared?

Most companies have already begun the migration of their website(s) to the HTTPS by default. It is important to maintain an exhaustive inventory of the company’s websites and pages and to control the associated SSL-TLS certificates, of which the main risks are renewal errors and poor implementation. It is essential to set up clear procedures and to associate to them a good communication towards the interlocutors in charge of the websites. Actors such as Nameshield are there to accompany you in this process. They have the expertise and tools necessary to simplify these tasks and reduce the risk of error.

The dangers of Wildcard certificates

wildcard certificate - TLS/SSL certificates
Image source: skylarvision via Pixabay

TLS/SSL certificates are used to authenticate servers (mostly Web) and encrypt traffic between websites and users. Thus, they ensure the integrity of the data exchanged and prevent data spying. The digitalization of the company and the world in general, as well as the browsers’ desire to impose HTTPS:// by default, have multiplied exponentially the need for certificates.

To meet these growing needs, the wildcard certificate (*.domainname.com) is increasingly being considered by companies. While it has some advantages, particularly in terms of costs reduction and flexibility, it is important to be aware of the disadvantages in order to choose the right certificate wisely. A brief overview of the wildcard certificate.

What is a wildcard certificate?

A standard TLS certificate secures an explicit host name (CN for Common Name or FQDN for Fully Qualified Domain Name) defined in its metadata. For example, Google holds a certificate for mail.google.com.

  • This certificate is only valid for: https://mail.google.com/
  • It cannot be used for: https://google.com/ – https://images.google.com/ – https://my.mail.google.com/

In other words, the host name must be an exact match. If you try to use this certificate on https://my.mail.google.com/ you will get a certificate error from your browser.

A TLS wildcard certificate is different. As its name implies, it uses a generic match rather than an exact match. This generic match is represented by “*” in the CN and covers all subdomains of the same level. Example with the *.google.com certificate.

  • This certificate is valid for: https://mail.google.com/ AND https://images.google.com/ as well as all possible subdomains of google.com.
  • It cannot be used for: https://google.com/ (without subdomain) or https://my.mail.google.com/ (the subdomain level is not the same).

The practical side of the wildcard certificate?

In some situations, the wildcard certificate is very useful. A host that proposes websites for different clients, hosted on a shared server, and accessible through different subdomains… client1.mysite.com, client2.mysite.com, client3… It is less practical, technically more complicated and de facto more expensive to ask for a new certificate for each client that registers; the simplest option is a wildcard certificate for *.mysite.com, a unique certificate that will cover all clients. The case is identical for a company that wishes to access its websites through FQDN derived from the same domain and hosted on the same web server, *.mycompany.com. So far, everything is okay.

But then, what is the risk?

In the cases above, all sites are hosted on a single server. In large companies, or for major websites, hosting is often more complex and on different servers. Let’s take again our example of Google with images.google.com and mail.google.com, these two applications are linked to different services of the company, hosted on different servers and managed by different technical teams. This kind of organization is extremely frequent in the company. And this is where the security of wildcard certificates stops.

The problem with wildcard certificates, and to a lesser extent with certificates containing multiple entries (the famous SAN, Subject Alternative Names), comes from the fact that they are deployed on several servers. Indeed, to ensure the security of a TLS/SSL certificate, it is absolutely necessary to protect the private key associated with the certificate. Ideally, it should be stored in a vault or in a HSM. When a certificate is installed on several servers, the associated private keys circulate, increasing the exposure to the risk of compromise.

Case of a compromised certificate

In case of a compromised certificate, or an error on the certificate (renewal problem), it is recommended to intervene quickly to limit the damage caused. Application for a new certificate (or renewal), installation of the new certificate and, if necessary, revocation of the compromised certificate.

In our example of creating websites on a single server, this is not a problem. We have only one server, it has been compromised, the stolen/expired/compromised certificate only works for this one server; we have limited the damage as much as possible.

In a “several servers” scenario, if the certificate of only one of the servers is affected, it becomes compromised on all of the servers, which will have consequences on all of them and require a much wider intervention to repair the damage, most often in an emergency, and assuming that all of the affected servers are identified. Indeed, it is not uncommon for the certificate to circulate within several teams and to be installed without being listed on a certain number of servers. The impact can be important.

Taking our example of Google. Let’s imagine that only the images.google.com server has been hacked and that mail.google.com has not been affected. The certificate for images.google.com being a wildcard certificate for *.google.com which is common to mail.google.com, the cyber-attacker having compromised the images service has by rebound usurped the identity of the mail.google.com server and can intercept the traffic of the mail service while this server has never been hacked!

Good practice: one TLS/SSL certificate per server…

In our last example, if we were to have two certificates instead of one, with each server having only access to its own certificate, we would have limited the risk. In an ideal world, each certificate should only be used for one server (or a homogeneous cluster of servers). Different services on different servers should have their own certificates, generally not wildcard certificates.

A wildcard can be used if you have a lot of host names, of subdomain type, pointing to the same service on the same server. Be careful however that this generic certificate does not also cover host names pointing to other servers, in which case each service should have its own certificates.

Lastly, if you have a few host names pointing to single servers and everything else on a single service, then it is better to disassociate the host names. For example, you may have a certificate for login.mysite.com and a (wildcard) certificate for *.clients.mysite.com. On this last example, if the number of clients is fixed or clearly defined, it is better to go for a certificate with a precise SAN list, to better control secure host names and not allow the httpS:// on uncontrolled host names.

Conclusion

The option of a wildcard certificate exists and it is a good thing for some very specific needs. But in practice, there should never be a need to install a wildcard certificate, nor should the same certificate be installed on different servers not built in cluster.

Let’s Encrypt, do not confuse confidentiality and security

Let’s Encrypt was recently the subject of discussions in the small world of TLS certificates, by suddenly revoking 3 048 289 certificates which should not have been issued. A bug in its validation software prevented CAA registrations controls, and the certificates in question should not have been initially issued. These significant disruptions resulted from this mass revocation, but it is difficult to complain about a free service.

I am often asked what I think of Let’s Encrypt, and I always have this same answer: Let’s Encrypt has done a lot to encrypt the web, but is undermining the security of the web. Encryption allows to ensure confidentiality (no one can spy on) and integrity (no one can modify) of exchanges. But encryption alone is not enough if I do not have any guarantee of the identity of the one I am exchanging with (legitimate or fraudulent?)… And that is the whole problem.

Let's Encrypt - SSL TLS certificates - Nameshield

In 2015, the Let’s Encrypt initiative supported by leading players of the Internet (EFF, Mozilla, Cisco, Akamaï…) was created with the purpose of massively and freely spreading SSL certificates to the whole world. More than five years later, the organization secures 190 million websites and has just announced that it has issued a billion certificates. The milestone was reached on February 27, 2020. This is undoubtedly a great performance.

96% of the web encrypted in January 2020

In 2015, less than half of the web traffic was encrypted, to reach 96% in January 2020. Of course, Let’s Encrypt is not the only player responsible for this rise. Edward Snowden launched the first alert, Google has largely stepped into the breach, between referencing policy and changes in web security indicators. But by providing to all, free certificates based on a largely automated system, Let’s Encrypt has democratized encryption… and put the concept of identity into oblivion.

No identity, no security

Let's Encrypt - SSL TLS certificates - Nameshield

Let’s Encrypt’s credo is simplicity, to “simplify to the extreme HTTPS deployment and put an end to its horribly complex bureaucracy” (says EFF in the launch campaign). The horribly complex bureaucracy has however a meaning: high authentication, which guarantees the identity of the certificate’s holder. Maybe not the absolute guarantee of legitimacy, not a guarantee of content either, but the guarantee of a registered company, legitimately owner of the concerned domain name and with a certificate validated according to a drastic procedure.

Let’s encrypt merely verifies the domain name’s control (DV, Domain Validation). One only has to click on a link in an email or to fill in a TXT record on the domain name’s DNS zone. Yet domain names registration in most TLDs is purely declarative. It is quite easy to register a domain name, to request a certificate from Let’s Encrypt and to publish a website in HTTPS://.

The results?

In five years, all phishing and fraudulent websites have switched to HTTPS://. Since 2016, Vincent Lynch alerted on this problem, 15 270 certificates with the term “Paypal” had been issued by Let’s Encrypt, 14 766 of these certificates were fraudulent.

The market has been brought down in terms of authentication level. Let’s Encrypt is far from being the only one responsible, Google and Mozilla, with their 70% of market shares, have largely supported the initiative, the big Cloud hosting providers followed, as well as the Certification Authorities, challenged on the prices. Today we have a secure web with 77% (November 2019) of certificates whose proprietary’s legitimacy is not verified.

High authentication changes the game

The web has become encrypted by default. Does that make it more secure? Nothing is certain. The web user educated for twenty years to check the presence of the padlock in the address bar, trusts a web where all the fraudulent websites display the security padlock. Today, Internet is confidential but that does not make it safe.

It is urgent to return to high authentication. High authentication ensures a set of compulsory, drastic and controlled steps in order to obtain certificates. The procedures are enacted by CA/B Forum, regularly strengthened, and followed by audit from Certification Authorities.

23% of the certificates are still issued on the basis of high authentication, mostly in the corporate world, where CISO are pushing to preserve it. We all have to rely on them and support initiatives supporting OV (Organization Validation) and EV (Extended Validation) certificates, especially EV to guarantee the identity of the websites visited by web users. While identity on the Internet seems to have been somewhat forgotten for some time in favor of confidentiality, it is likely to come back to the spotlight again soon, driven in particular by web users and the need of personal data protection.

Apple announces the limitation of SSL certificates duration to 1 year in Safari

Apple Safari - SSL certifcates one year - Nameshield
Source de l’image : kropekk_pl via Pixabay

Apple announced this week that the maximum lifetime of SSL / TLS certificates on its devices and Safari browser would be limited to 398 days (1 year, and 1 month to cover the renewal period). The change, announced by Apple at the CA / Browser Forum meeting in Bratislava, Slovakia, will take effect for certificates issued after August 31, 2020.

Apple’s announcement follows a failure of the CA / B Forum’s vote on one-year certificates (Bulletin SC22), which was held in August 2019, and reflects a continuing trend to shorten lifespan certificates. Following this vote, Google had also expressed its intention to reduce certificate lifetime outside the framework of the CA / B forum if they do not position themselves quickly. This announcement is a bit of a surprise, we would rather have thought that Google or Mozilla would take the first step.

What are the consequences for companies and their SSL / TLS certificates?

Is shorter validity a good thing?

The shorter the validity period of a certificate, the more secure the certificate. By requiring replacement of certificates over a shorter period of time, security updates are made to certificates, they deploy faster. The shorter private key lifetime of a certificate is also a strong recommendation from online security players to limit the potential duration of fraud following a compromise.

From a security perspective, everyone agrees that reducing the life of certificates is a good thing. The problem lies on the operational side with the consequences of this reduction being: more frequent intervention on certificates, therefore greater complexity in keeping an up to date inventory and the need for optimal organization with partners for certificate issuance.

Should Apple’s announcement be taken into account?

Safari is one of the two main web browsers, with 17.7% in January 2020, behind Google Chrome (58.2%) and ahead of Microsoft Internet Explorer and Edge (7.1%). It is difficult to ignore the announcement as it will affect 1/5 of Internet users, what is more is that if Google does follow, it is better to anticipate and prepare. Nameshield’s has already adopted this stance.

Things to keep in mind

Certificates issued before September 1, 2020 are not affected by this change. They will remain valid for the entire two-year period. All certificates issued on or after September 1 must be renewed each year to be considered reliable by Safari.

We must therefore prepare to move towards having certificates with a maximum duration of one year compared to the current two years. Being able to rely on a partner and effective tools is more essential than ever.

Towards the end of the correlation between authentication and technical certificate management

What seems to be taking shape within the CA / B Forum is the idea of allowing an authentication duration identical to that which we know today (two years) while forcing the certificates to be replaced several times during this same period.

The main Certification Authorities, the bodies that issue certificates, anticipate these changes and are working on several automation systems to manage certificate life cycle. They would thus limit the need to go through a potentially cumbersome re-authentication procedure with each replacement. Companies could replace their certificates as many times as they want during this period. This would make it possible to anticipate possible further reductions in the maximum lifetime of certificates.

The trend is also towards the installation of automation tools for the maintenance of a precise inventory of certificates on the one hand and technical reinstallation on the other. Nameshield is closely monitoring these various developments and will allow you to continue working with confidence.

Our team is also at your disposal to anticipate these changes and answer any questions you may have.

Soon a maximum duration of one year for SSL certificates?

Soon a maximum duration of one year for SSL/TLS certificates?

What is happening?

The industry actors plan to reduce the lifetime of SSL/TLS certificates, allowing the HTTPS display in browsers, to 13 months, i.e. almost half of the present lifetime of 27 months, in order to improve security.

Google through the CA/Browser Forum has indeed proposed this modification, approved by Apple and a Certification Authority, making it eligible to vote. During the next CA/B Forum meetings, if the vote is accepted, the modification of the requirements will come into effect in March 2020. Any certificate issued after the entry into force date will have to respect the requirements of the shortened validity period.

The aim for this reduction is to complicate things for cyber attackers by reducing the duration of the use of the potentially stolen certificates. It could also force companies to use the most recent and the most secured available encrypting algorithms.

If the vote fails, it’s not to be excluded that browsers supporting this requirement, unilaterally implement it in their root program, thus forcing the change to the Certification Authorities. It’s likely that this could be the case, this change follows Google’s precedent initiative that aimed to reduce the lifespan from three years to two years in 2018, period during which Google already wished to reduce it to 13 months or even less.

Who is impacted?

The changes proposed by Google would have an impact on all the users of TLS certificates of public trust, regardless of the Certification Authority that issued the certificate. If the vote passes, all certificates issued or reissued after March 2020 will have a maximum validity of 13 months. The companies using certificates with a validity period superior to 13 months will be encouraged to reconsider their systems and evaluate the impact of the proposed modifications on their implementation and their use.

The TLS certificates issued before March 2020 with a validity period superior to 13 months will stay operational. The public non-TLS certificate, for the code signing, the TLS private code and clients’ certificates, etc. are not concerned.  It will not be necessary to revoke an existing certificate following the implementation of the new standard. The reduction will have to be applied during the renewal.

What do the market players think about this?

It would be a global change for the industry with impacts on all the Certification Authorities. They view this proposition in a negative light. We can see an economic interest above all, but not solely…

The main argument is that the market is not ready in terms of automation system of orders and certificates implementations. Indeed, there would be more human interventions with the risks associated with poor handling, or simply a higher risk of forgetting a certificate renewal.

For Certification Authorities, reducing the certificates’ lifespan to such a short term mainly presents an increase of the human costs related to the certificate portfolio management. If they are not fundamentally against this decision, they would particularly like more time to study what users and companies think.

The position of browsers makers

Be it Google or Mozilla, the spearheads of the native HTTPS massive adoption for all websites and the supporters of the Let’sEncrypt initiative, what is important is the encrypting of all web traffic. A reduction of the certificates lifespan reduces the risk of certificates theft on a long period and encourages the massive adoption of automated management systems. For these two actors, an ideal world would have certificate of maximum 3 months. If they are attentive to the market as to not impose their views too quickly, it is more than likely that in the long term the certificates’ lifespan will continue to decrease.

Nameshield’s opinion 

The market continues its evolution towards shorter and shorter certificates’ validity, as a continual decrease of the authentication levels and consequently a need for management automated solutions that will increase. We will align on these requirements and advise our customers to prepare themselves for this reduction which will, without a doubt, arrive. Our Certification Authorities partners will also follow this evolution and will allow to provide all systems of required permanent inventory and automation.

To be heard

The CA/Browser Forum accepts comments of external participants and all discussions are public. You can directly enter your comments to the Forum distribution list:  https://cabforum.org/working-groups/ (at the bottom of the page). Nameshield is in contact with CA/Browser Forum participants and will inform you of the future decisions.

The Nameshield SSL interface has had a complete makeover

The Nameshield SSL interface has had a complete makeover

More user-friendly, more comprehensive, more attractive… our brand new and improved Nameshield SSL interface is being launched on Thursday, June 13th allowing you to manage all of your certificates.

You will now have access to key metrics on your certificate portfolio, to different certificate lookup views (such as complete portfolio, detailed overview, certificates nearing expiry, pending orders, expired or revoked certificates), to an Organization and Contact management tool and a redesigned ordering system.

Lastly, a decision support tool has been included in the interface to help you choose the certificate that’s right for your needs.

The certificate range has been updated to cover all types of certificates, SSL, RGS, Code Signing, Individual certificates and with all levels of authentication.

The SSL team remains at your disposal for a demonstration and a complete user guide is available covering all possible operations and actions.

Contact us directly at certificates@nameshield.net.